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‘Too Big to Fail and Too Big to
Succeed’:1 Accounting and
Privatisation in the Prison Service of
England and Wales
ANDREA MENNICKEN*
Abstract: This paper is concerned with the challenges involved in the transfor-
mation of the prison into a performance-oriented accounting entity. It examines
the implication of private sector accounting and consulting expertise in redefining
prison values and prison performance, and it discusses the consequences this had for
definitions of risk and responsibility. The paper shows how the reforms promoted a
systemic decentring of Prison Service accountability. Prison managers and regulators
came to be inserted into hierarchies of expertise and credibility shaped by quests for
commensuration and auditability. Further, the paper shows how the reform attempts
brought about a situation of institutional lock-in by contributing, as the outgoing
HM Chief Inspector of Prisons Anne Owers has put it in 2010, to the creation of an
inflated prison system ‘too big to fail, and too big to succeed’.
Keywords: prisons, performance measurement, New Public Management, privatisa-
tion, neoliberalism
INTRODUCTION
This paper is concerned with the challenges involved in the transformation of the
prison into a performance-oriented ‘accounting entity’ (Arnold and Oakes, 1995;
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and Kurunma¨ki, 1999). It examines the implication of private sector accounting
and consulting expertise in redefining prison values and prison performance, and
it discusses the consequences this had for definitions of risk and responsibility.
Only a few studies have investigated the roles of private sector accounting and
consulting in prison reform attempts (Cooper and Taylor, 2005; Humphrey,
1991 and 1994; Liebling, 2004; and Taylor and Cooper, 2008). The paper traces
the impact of market testing, benchmarking and performance measurement
in transforming the prison from a rules-based, bureaucratic institution to a
calculating, economically minded organisation. Drawing on studies of accounting
and New Public Management (for a useful review see Broadbent and Guthrie,
2008), the paper contributes not only to understanding economic and operational
effects of private sector-oriented accounting reforms in public sector settings, it
also draws attention to the complex relationships between politics, calculation
and morality (Hirschman, 1997 [1977]).2
Following Kurunma¨ki (1999, p. 219), ‘to define something as an accounting
entity is to represent an area of interest, to make real and to circumscribe
the objects and activities of which financial reports will speak’. Underlying
the concept is the fiction of separable economic units and aspirations to use
accounting as a tool for the mapping and managing of social and economic
relations (Hopwood, 1984; Miller, 2001; and Miller and Rose, 1990). But
accounting entity boundaries are neither easy to draw nor unproblematic. As
Kurunma¨ki (1999, pp. 219–20) points out:
The making of an accounting entity is a political process with potentially significant
implications. The boundaries which delineate an organization as an economic unit
separate from other organizations are not [ . . . ] clear-cut, natural or fixed [ . . . ]. The
actors who identify entities and define their limits are many and varied, and may speak
on behalf of legal, economic, social, political, aesthetic and professional interests.
Questions of what to count, what categories to employ, what entity to
account for, and where one accounting entity ends and another begins, are
consequential for labour relations, organisation values, ethical commitments
and the regulation of performance, risk and responsibility (Arnold and Oakes,
1995).
Since the late 1980s, the Prison Service of England and Wales has
undertaken a series of steps to transform prisons into competitive, performance-
oriented accounting entities. Of particular importance, in this context, was the
government’s engagement in prison privatisation (James et al., 1997). Against
the background of Thatcher’s neoliberal reforms, prison overcrowding, exploding
costs and a series of serious incidents (Resodihardjo, 2009; and Woolf, 1991),
prison privatisation, and private sector accounting, transferred into the Prison
Service via consulting agencies and commercial security organisations, were
called upon:
to introduce innovative approaches into the management of prisons and prisoners,
and to break away from the constraints of traditional Prison Service values, attitudes
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and methods, which were regarded by some as stifling progress (James et al., 1997,
p. 62).
Until then, the Prison Service had been characterised by a relative absence of
formal accounting and accountability systems. As Derek Lewis, Chief Executive
and Director General of the Prison Service, 1993–1995, writes:
There were no forward plans, no budgets, no assessments of key people, no financial
or operating reports. [ . . . ] There was little information of any kind about how the
various parts of the service were performing – and such as there was provided no basis
for judging whether we were doing well or badly (Lewis, 1997, pp. 7, 21).
In the 1990s this changed. As in other public services, increasing emphasis
came to be placed on managerial process, financial control and performance
measurement (Pollitt, 1993). This paper examines the different regimes of
justification and realms of expertise that sought to establish the prison
as a performance-oriented accounting entity, and it discusses consequences
this had for definitions of prison values, risk and responsibility. First, the
intertwinement of accounting with privatisation is explored, and the roles
that non-governmental organisations, management consulting firms and private
security corporations played in delineating new, performance-oriented entity
boundaries. Second, the paper analyses the accounting instruments themselves,
in particular instruments of prison rating and performance measurement, and
examines how boundaries between the calculable and incalculable were redrawn,
and how new relations of competition and cooperation were formed between
different sets of calculative expertise. Third, it investigates how these changes
contributed to the transformation of objects and subjects of prison regulation
and accountability.
The analysis is based on the study of media and parliamentary data,
government reports, White Papers, reports by the HM Prison Service, the
National Offender Management Service (NOMS), the National Audit Office,
the Public Accounts Committee, and the HM Inspectorate of Prisons, as well
as documents from prison interest groups. The documents were analysed and
coded in relation to objectives and problematisations underlying performance-
oriented entity reforms; the intertwinement of the reforms with privatisation
and consulting; conflicts; and effects on prison values and accountability.
PRIVATISATION, ACCOUNTING, AND THE ETHOS OF CONTESTABILITY
The rise and spread of private sector accounting instruments into the prison
system of England and Wales is inextricably linked to wider processes of
governmental reform and neoliberal policy (Hood, 1995; and Miller and Rose,
2008). Of particular relevance, in this context, are the linkages that came to
be established between accounting, management consulting and privatisation.
Between 1980 and 1987, prison expenditure had increased in real terms by 72%
C© 2013 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
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(James et al., 1997, p. 48). The overcrowding of prisons had become a serious
issue.3 Parallel to the crisis within the Prison Service (Resodihardjo, 2009; and
Woolf, 1991), overcrowding, exploding costs, and a series of severe prisoner riots
in the late 1980s and 19904, faith in the state to manage public sector services
had generally been declining (Hood, 1991; Lapsley, 1994; Miller and Rose, 1990;
and Pollitt, 1993).
Against the backdrop of these problems, the foundation of private prisons5
and the enhancement of inter-organisational competition via market testing
were thought to improve prison quality and security (Black, 1993; Home Affairs
Committee, 1987; Home Office, 1988 and 1991; and Prison Reform Trust,
1994).6 The ethos of competition, later rephrased in terms of ‘contestability’
(Carter, 2003; and Home Office, 2004), was thought to bring about improved
‘service delivery’ at reduced costs. Supported were these developments by the
government’s Financial Management Initiative (FMI), launched in 1982, and the
Private Finance Initiative (PFI), launched in 1992 (Carter, 2001; and Humphrey,
1991 and 1994) (see Figure 1).
Private sector-oriented accounting instruments, particularly tools of perfor-
mance and cost management, were introduced to ‘tackle under-performing
prisons’ (Home Office, 2000, p. 1), to better ‘understand the link between
resources and outputs’, and to identify ‘failing prisons’ (Home Office, 2000).
They were called upon to help redefine prisons as competitive economic units
responsible for their own performance management (Home Affairs Committee,
1997; and Home Office, 1988 and 2000).
Yet, the shift towards creating separable, performance-oriented prison
entities and systems of ‘managerial accountability’ (Home Office, 2000) did
not originate inside government. Instrumental for articulating and advancing
the reform proposals were actors located outside government (James et al., 1997;
and Nathan, 2003). These included private security corporations, management
consulting firms and neoliberal think tanks. In the late 1980s, globally operating
security firms, like the Corrections Corporation of America (CCA), Wackenhut
(now part of G4S) and Group 4 (now G4S), sought to expand the markets
for their services. Perceiving correctional services as lucrative investment
opportunity, these firms pushed for policies seeking to establish prisons as
separate economic units, governed by the market, economic calculation and
objectives of profit making. As James et al. (1997, p. 43) point out, Carter Goble,
a US consulting firm with a focus on criminal justice, had been hired by Group
4 to undertake ‘extensive research to identify possible sites in Europe where the
best opportunities might lie for expanding the private correctional market’.
Another important key player lobbying for prison privatisation and
performance-oriented accounting change was the Adam Smith Institute (ASI).
The ASI defines itself as ‘one of the world’s leading think tanks’: ‘Inde-
pendent, non-profit, and non-partisan, it works to promote libertarian and
free market ideas through research, publishing, media commentary, and
educational programmes.’7 In the 1980s, the ASI heavily criticised the Prison
C© 2013 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
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Figure 1
Key Dates in the Reform of the Prison Service
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Service for being ‘unimaginative’ (Young, 1987, p. 6). The Institute made
several representations to the Home Office, disseminated publications and held
seminars promoting the idea of private-sector involvement in the prison system
(James et al., 1997).8
For accountants and management consultants, the reform requests provided
a valuable opportunity to extend their realms of influence and expertise. The
government hired accounting and management consulting firms to evaluate
pros and cons of prison privatisation (Cooper and Taylor, 2005) and to help with
the development of new accounting tools (Humphrey, 1991). In 1988, the Home
Office wrote:
Management consultants are to be engaged. Their task will be to examine in
detail the practical feasibility of the various options for involving the private sector
C© 2013 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
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[ . . . ]. This work will include: [ . . . ] devising means by which proposals from private
companies could be assessed against relevant criteria (including value for money);
considering procedures to ensure the smooth interaction of contractors’ operations
with other elements in the criminal justice system; looking at the consequences of the
allocation of prisoners between contracted-out and the remaining facilities; drawing up
performance criteria for contracts; recommending management systems; and looking
at commercial considerations, such as bases for payment and terms of contracts (Home
Office, 1988, pp. 9; 16–17).
The Home Office appointed accounting firm Deloitte, Haskins and Sells to
conduct the work (James et al., 1997, pp. 53–54). Earlier, in 1986, the Home
Office had hired PA Consulting Group to participate in the preparation of the
reform package known as Fresh Start, released in 1987 and aimed at freeing
up to 20% of spare capacity in the prison system (McDermott and King, 1989).
In 1989, the same consulting firm had developed for the Home Office twenty-
two objectives against which individual prison performance was to be measured.
According to ex-prison governor Coyle this was the first time that the Prison
Service had engaged in the development of formal performancemeasures (Coyle,
2005, p. 48).
Apart from individual prison establishments, also the Prison Service as a
whole was to be redefined as an ‘accounting entity’. In 1993, shortly after
the first private prison had been opened, the government set up the Prison
Service as a quasi-autonomous Executive Agency with a set of private sector-
oriented performance targets and budget controls, monitored by the Home
Office. The Prison Service Executive Agency was one of the largest of the
Next Steps agencies, with around 39,000 staff in 1994–95 (74% of the Home
Office total) and a budget of £1.6 billion (26% of Home Office spending)
(Talbot, 1996, p. 5). The Agency was established with the aim ‘to improve
the management of services by reducing the domination of policy specialists in
Whitehall’ (ibid.). Its first Chief Executive, Derek Lewis, was recruited from the
private sector. In 1993, building on the work of PA Consulting Group, Lewis
introduced eight key performance indicators and six goals against which the
performance of the Prison Service was to be evaluated (Coyle, 2005, p. 48). Lewis
commented:
1993–94 saw the assignment of greater responsibility and accountability to governors,
the introduction of targets for establishments, rigorous measurement of performance,
the publication of a new code of operating standards and the added stimulus of
competition from the private sector (cited in Liebling, 2004, p. 18).
Poorly performing public sector prisons came to be exposed to market tests,
i.e., direct competition from external providers. In August 1992, HM Prison
Manchester (Strangeways) became the first public prison to be ‘market tested’
(Prison Reform Trust, 1994, pp. 26–33). In preparation of their (successful) bid,
the prison management made use of external consultants and their accounting
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expertise. Consulting firms came to function as ‘carriers’ (Sahlin-Andersson and
Engwall, 2002) contributing to the redefining of the prison as an ‘accounting
entity’ and the travelling and translation (Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996) of
private sector accounting instruments into the Prison Service. As ex-prison
governor Coyle (2005, p. 49) put it, consulting firms helped the Prison Service
and individual prisons with the development of a ‘managerial approach to
running prisons and the application of many of the principles which had long
been adopted in the business world.’
In 2003, the rise and spread of private sector-oriented accounting techniques
was given a further boost by the introduction of benchmarking and performance
ratings (Table 1). The benchmarking and rating programmes were accompanied
by Lord Carter’s correctional services review in which he called for the
establishment of the principle of ‘contestability’ within the Prison Service
(Carter, 2003; and Home Office, 2004). Lord Carter, ‘a healthcare entrepreneur
and management consultant’ (Nellis, 2006., p. 53), introduced the concept
of contestability as a mechanism to increase the involvement of the private
and voluntary sectors in offender management. With his contestability agenda,
Carter intended to drive up public sector standards, increase quality and
save costs. According to Nellis (2006, p. 53), Carter’s review exemplified
‘the messianic managerialism’ – the re-engineering of existing structures and
functions to produce ‘guaranteed’, quantifiable behavioural outcomes – that had
come to characterise New Labour’s approach to modernisation.
Table 1
Excerpt from ‘Prison Quarterly Ratings, Quarter 4, 2009/10’
Establishment Rating Performance Against Last Quarter
Acklington 3 No change
Altcourse 3 Drop in performance
Ashfield 3 No change
Ashwell 3 No change
Askham Grange 4 No change
Aylesbury 3 No change
Bedford 4 No change
Belmarsh 3 No change
Birmingham 2 No change
Blantyre House 3 No change
Blundeston 3 No change
Notes:
Rating 4 = Exceptional performance
Rating 3 = Good performance
Rating 2 = Requiring development
Rating 1 = Serious concerns
Source: National Offender Management Service (2010, pp. 1–2).
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The Prison Service commented on the benchmarking programme and prison
ratings in its magazine Prison Service News (Number 229, May 2004):
Twelve months after their introduction, phrases like performance testing, improve-
ment planning and high performing prisons, are now firmly embedded in the Prison
Service lexicon.9
The next section analyses consequences and challenges of the reforms. Instru-
ments of prison rating and performance measurement did not only contribute to
the formation but also problematisation of prison entity boundaries. Elements
of private sector accounting practice had to be melded with existing prison rules
and practices. Tensions arose between the new accounting tools and existing
government codes and practices.
CALCULATING PRISON PERFORMANCE
Turning to the question of how the performance of the [Prison] Service is evaluated
it is clear to us that there is no clarity on this subject [emphasis added]. Ministers,
managers, trade unions, staff, HM Inspectorate, apart from the wider world, all seem
to have their own perception of what is acceptable or reasonable in the Prison Service.
No organisation can hope to be confident about its performance when the benchmarks
against which it is measured vary so widely or change so often (Home Office,
2000, p. 4).
In the Prison Service, performance measurement has considerably changed
over time reflecting ‘shifting priorities and improvements in thinking about
the limitations of measures selected’ (Liebling, 2004, p. 63). The introduction
of key performance indicators (KPI) and targets (KPT) in 1993 was closely
connected to the general rise of NPM techniques and increasing pressures
to audit and publicly demonstrate performance (Power, 1997). KPIs, KPTs and
Standard Audit ratings were important for ‘doing business with the Treasury’,
as requests for funding were increasingly tied to performance on specified
targets (Liebling, 2004, p. 65). The measures were enrolled in attempts aimed
at ‘exacting responsibility’ (Miller, 2001, p. 380), following ideals of ‘total, finely
calibrated control’ (Nellis, 2001, p. 33). Further, the measures were introduced
to aid ‘commensuration’ (Espeland and Stevens, 1998). They should make it
possible to compare and evaluate different prison establishments – public and
private – ‘according to a common metric’ (ibid., p. 313):
The ability to make comparisons between different institutions is important because it
is clear that there is a very wide variation in the staffing, resourcing and performance
of establishments with similar responsibilities. It is of particular value to make
such judgements between establishments of the Prison Service and those which are
separately managed by private agencies (Home Office, 2000, p. 4).
Prison ratings produced via standardised performance measures should help
establish a ‘common language’ (Power, 2004, p. 774) for making judgements
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about failure and successfulness of different prison entities. But the aspirations
connected to standardisation and measurement proved to be very difficult to
realise. Over the past fifteen years or so the Prison Service, similar to other
public services (Hood et al., 2004; and Kurunma¨ki and Miller, 2006), has
been confronted with an avalanche of numbers, targets and indicators. What
constitutes good prison performance remains contested and commensuration,
‘the transformation of different qualities into a common metric’ (Espeland and
Stevens, 1998), a hardly achievable goal.
ACCOUNTING AVALANCHES AND ISSUES OF INCOMMENSURABILITY
Since their first introduction by PA Consulting Group in 1989 and Prison Service
Chief Executive Lewis in 1993, who had been hired from the private sector, the
number of prison KPIs has steadily increased from 8 to 18 in 2000–01 (Liebling,
2004, pp. 58–63), to 28 for the newly created National Offender Management
Service Agency (NOMS) in 2008–09 (joining up the prison and probation
services).10 Public prisons have to report their performance in accordance with
‘measures of outcome set by the Secretary of State to assess performance of the
Service under ‘Agency’ status’, ‘extended outcomemeasures requested internally
as part of a new business planning process’, and Prison Service Performance
Standards.11
Compliance with the standards is measured via performance indicators, such
as number of unqualified Prison Service accounts, costs per place, number of
prisoners entering drug rehabilitation programmes, number of accidents and of
reportable major injuries, and audit compliance (see e.g., NOMS, 2009). The
plethora of performance measures enters a weighted scorecard, drawn up in the
fashion of Kaplan and Norton’s Balanced Scorecard (Kaplan and Norton, 1992),
on the basis of which performance ratings are drawn up, similar to the ‘star
ratings’ of the NHS. Since 2003, prisons (public and private) are rated on a 1
to 4 performance scale. Level 4 is awarded to excellent establishments that are
delivering ‘exceptionally high performance’. Level 1 indicates a ‘poor performer’
(Table 1). Prisons in the lowest category (Level 1) are subjected to ‘performance
tests’. They are given six months in which to improve their performance (Bryans,
2007, p. 73). A failure to improve means that the prison faces closure or being
contracted-out to the private sector (ibid.). Since the introduction of the ratings,
prison governors find themselves operating in a ‘more competitive’ and ‘less
collegiate’ world, ‘more than ever before, their focus is on how prisons are
performing relative to other similar prisons’ (Bryans, 2007, p. 74).
The avalanche of numbers, ratings and performance measures, at least in
part, was driven by the desire to construct proxies for ‘uncertain and elusive
qualities’ (Espeland and Stevens, 1998, p. 316), and to compare and demonstrate
performance across (public and private) prison establishments. As Miller (1992,
p. 61) writes:
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By translating the concrete processes of car manufacturing, the assembly of electrical
goods, or the administration of health care and education into a single figure
[e.g., a prison rating, added], accounting makes comparable activities and processes
whose physical characteristics and geographical location may bear no resemblance
whatsoever. [ . . . ] The neutrality and social authority accorded to the single figure
is one that is set above the fray, apart from disputes and political interests, and
endowed with a legitimacy that seems difficult to contest or dispute (Miller, 1992,
pp. 68–69).
However, in the case of prison performance measurement, commensuration
proved to be very difficult to realise. Quests for commensurability, and
the connected explosion of performance measures, were accompanied and
accelerated by problematisations of ‘incommensurability’ (Espeland and Stevens,
1998). As we know from the numerous performance measurement studies in
accounting, even seemingly straightforward accounting measures, like measures
of cost, are far from being unproblematic. As Hood et al. (1997) point out it is
far from clear how one should calculate prison costs. Should it be expressed
as a per diem rate for prisoners, or as a fixed sum assuming 100 per cent
occupancy? Prisons, both publicly managed and privately managed, came to
be ‘overburdened’ with performance measures, ‘making the monitoring of
performance and prioritisation between targets difficult’ (House of Commons,
2003, pp. 4–5).
Inconsistencies occurred between the performance measures and targets for
different prison entities (House of Commons, 2003; and National Audit Office,
2003):
There are inconsistencies between the targets set for PFI and public prisons. For
example, the average target for purposeful activity in a public prison is 20.6 hours a
week per prisoner, as opposed to 29.5 hours a week in PFI prisons (House of Commons,
2003, p. 12).
The contracts negotiated for each private prison differed, making it difficult
to draw comparisons between different prison establishments. Variation in the
characteristics of different prison entities further undermined attempts aimed
at establishing comparability. Operational efficiency and cost effectiveness of a
prison are hard to separate from variables of size, design, location, function and
age (House of Commons, 2003, p. 11). Mr Davidson from the Public Accounts
Committee remarked in this respect:
I was looking on page 23 giving the various categories and I found it immensely
complex to draw any lessons from it. Then, when I turned to page 8, the clearest
single correlation is between the age of the prison and whether or not it is in the red
or any other category, with 50% of those in the red category being built in the 1800s
and only 20% in the orange and 10% in the green (House of Commons, 2003, Ev15).
Such correlations highlight the problematic nature of any postulated corre-
spondence between different accounting measures and an accounting entity’s
overall performance. One could argue that the correlation between prison
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performance and age could be controlled for if private sector capital asset
accounting were applied, which identifies obsolescence in assets. However, when
the prison ratings were introduced capital asset accounting was not yet widely
practiced within the Prison Service. Furthermore, capital asset accounting does
not solve the problem of the impact of prison design, location and function
on operational performance (e.g., on costs, re-offending rates, security etc.).12
Calculative chains of commensuration are porous and fragile. This also comes
to light when looking at the relationship between prison performance and the
calculation of financial penalty points (Tables 2 and 3).
If a private prison contractor failed to meet a certain percentage of the
performance target, penalty points accrued (National Audit Office, 2003, p. 11).
These penalty points were translated into financial deductions. The National
Audit Office criticised the penalty system stating that ‘the level of financial
deductions is not an accurate indicator of performance’ (National Audit Office,
2003, p. 17):
The Prison Service could not provide a clear audit trail between historical performance,
in terms of fixed fines for specific incidents or performance points against baseline,
and the actual financial deductions. The earlier financial deductions at Altcourse
and Parc were reduced following negotiations between the Prison Service and the
contractors. These negotiations were not solely concerned with the prisons’ operational
performance. They also took account of problems with inflexible contract monitoring.
The Commissioner for Correctional Services replied:
It is very difficult to get an exact correlation between financial penalties and the
performance of a prison. For example, even Altcourse prison, which I think everybody
Table 2
A Selection of PFI Contractual Performance Measures
Performance Penalty
Performance Measure Points per Incident
Failure of security procedures 5
Key/lock compromise 50
Items smuggled in 20
Assaults against prisoners or staff member 20
Incident of roof climbing 5
Failure to ensure prisoners see health care staff on arrival 1
Failure to comply with cleaning schedule 2.5
Delivering programme hours of <95% of contract standard 5
Delivering programme hours of <75% of contract standard 10
Delivering programme hours of <50% of contract standard 25
Source: National Audit Office (2003, p. 14).
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Table 3
Penalty Performance Deductions (Jan–Dec 2002)
Penalty
Performance
Points
Acquired
Jan–Dec 02
Adjusted
Baseline1
Cost per
Point
Performance
Deductions
Deductions
as % of
Annual
Payment
Escapes
Fines
Ashfield 6,362 2,848 £94 £331,121 3 £0
Dovegate 3,573 1,784 £227 £406,392 1.5 £0
Altcourse 3,964 6,849 £293 £0 0 £0
Parc 6,157 6,443 £141 £0 0 £0
Lowdham Grange 301 620 £105 £0 0 £0
Forest Bank 4,178 8,052 £170 £0 0 £0
Rye Hill 2 2 2 £5,5893 0.043 £60,000
Notes:
1The contractual baseline is adjusted to take into account overcrowding and assaults in comparator
prisons.
2Rye Hill has a different contractual framework for calculating performance deductions based on
quarterly and annual penalty performance deductions, each priced differently.
3Therefore these figures refer to the most recent contractual year rather than January-December
2002.
Source: National Audit Office (2003, p. 15).
who visits thinks is a very good prison and is possibly the best prison we have, has been
fined something like £420,000. It does not mean it is a bad prison, it means that we
would now view the performance measures we introduced, when we were setting up
Altcourse as one of the first, as being somewhat inflexible (House of Commons, 2003,
Ev8.)
The incommensurability of prison entities is further problematised in the
dialogue below:
Mr Williams (Committee of Public Accounts): Can you just clarify a point which is
genuine misunderstanding? In Figure 9 on page 15, cost per penalty point, Ashfield is
£94, Altcourse is £293. Why is the cost per point three times higher in one than in the
other?
Mr Narey (Commissioner for Correctional Services): It is because each penalty point
regime — and I confess to having had to have a tutorial on this just this morning —
is unique to that particular prison. If you want to compare how a particular prison has
performed against another one, you cannot just look at the penalty points incurred,
but you will see that prisons have very different base lines, that is, the number of
penalty points which are tolerated before a financial penalty is enforced. That again
reflects the fact that we have different schemes for different prisons.
Mr Williams: Why was Ashfield set at £94? Why is it so different, particularly in view of
subsequent events? The worst offender of the lot, yet it has the least disadvantageous
penalty point system?
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Mr Narey: It has been significantly at a disadvantage in terms of the money we have
taken from it, a total of £4.2 million, as Mr Beeston said. Whatever the penalty point
regime, the fact is that we have been able to use sanctions against Ashfield going way
beyond the use of penalty points, in this case in closing places and saying this is not
a safe enough place in which to put young prisoners so as to make a very significant
financial sanction.
Mr Williams: Was the £4.2 million based just on penalty points or on other factors?
Mr Narey: No, the £4.2 million was primarily based on closing places and saying we
do not think this is a place which is safe enough or good enough to meet our standard
requirements so we are not going to put young people into there.
(House of Commons, 2003, Ev18.)
Performance measures, such as financial penalty points, are criticised for
not being representatives of ‘actual’ prison performance. As many performance
measurement studies have shown before for other areas, performance measures
very often give only limited or no insight at all into ‘what is going on’ in the
entity they seek to represent.13 In the dialogues above, the inflexibility of the
performance measurement system is highlighted and the fact that different
penalty point regimes exist for different prisons. There exists a mismatch
between perceived prison performance (e.g., with respect to safety and security)
and performance according to awarded penalty points. As a result, trust in the
measures is undermined. Yet, whether prison governors believe the measures
or not, the measures have changed their working environment (see e.g., Bryans,
2007). As ex-prison governor Coyle (2005, pp. 49) puts it, the introduction of
formalised performance measurement led to ‘a concentration on process, on
how things are done, rather than on outcome, that is, what is being achieved.’
Prison governors have to meet increasingly detailed reporting demands, facing
‘constant oversight from internal auditors and external inspecting bodies’ (ibid.,
p. 97). Emphasis has been shifted away from ‘commitment to any correctional
ideology’ to a focus on ‘scientific management’ of individual prison entities
(ibid.).
And yet, not all dimensions of prison performance can be measured at the
level of individual prison entities. The reduction of re-offending, for example,
constitutes a performance objective challenging prison entity assumptions.
Individual prisoners and their movements in between prisons make it very
difficult to attribute re-offending rates to the performance of individual prison
entities:
Mr Osborne (Public Accounts Committee): One of the things mentioned here is that
there is no measure of actual reduction in re-offending rates. I would be interested
to know whether you have any figures for the difference in re-offending rates in PFI
prisons and public prisons?
Mr Narey (Commissioner for Correctional Services): No, we do not. As I explained to
the Committee last time I was here, because we move prisoners about so frequently, it
is very difficult to attest to the particular work done by one prison. . . . We are trying
C© 2013 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
TOO BIG TO FAIL AND TOO BIG TO SUCCEED 219
to do work now, to try to see whether we can link future offending behaviour after
release with the time spent in a particular prison. For example, if someone spent most
of their time in Bullingdon prison and they have not gone back to re-offending, we will
try to make a link between the prison where they spent most of their time and their
future behaviour. It is very difficult . . . . While we move prisoners about quite as much
as we have to because of overcrowding, it is very difficult to tie down and credit to a
particular prison, what might have happened to someone after release.
(House of Commons, 2003, Ev14.)
This quote illustrates how problematic it is to draw boundaries around individual
(public and private) prison establishments. Prisoners are ‘moved about’. They
transcend prison boundaries and the accounting for them. Redefining the prison
as a performance-oriented entity creates new visibilities and invisibilities (Arnold
and Oakes, 1995; and Kurunma¨ki, 1999), leaving inter-organisational activities
unaccounted for, as also the following example illustrates:
Mr Williams (Public Accounts Committee): Going back to our hearing on Fazakerley
prison years ago, when they had just finished their first year I think, and when there
had been trouble at Parc and a riot, we discovered that you had to call on prison
officers from Cardiff and Swansea to go in and help out. I asked whether they received
any compensation from the private operator of Parc for the provision of their staff.
I was told no. Has this situation changed now? The staffing is so low in the private
prisons that they do not have anyone they can send to help out with the public
prisons.
Mr Narey (Commissioner of Correctional Services): We have arrangements of mutual
support. For example, when we had a very serious incident last autumn at Lincoln
prison, some of the staff who came to help reassert control came from private sector
prisons. The two sectors support one another. A private sector prison running into
difficulties like that would suffer significant numbers of penalty points which would
result in fines, if they breached the tolerance levels. There is not a straight link. The
private sector do not pay for the mutual aid in the same way that we do not pay the
private sector when they offer mutual aid to public sector prisons.
(House of Commons, 2003, Ev19.)
As Narey points out, the performance measurement system does not recognise
mutual aid and support that prison entities provide to each other. Activities
of inter-organisational cooperation and exchange do not fit conceptualisations
of the prison as an accounting entity with clearly delineable organisational
boundaries. The problem at hand here is not only one of ‘misrepresentation’.
Prison ratings and performance measures, aimed at establishing the prison as
a performance-oriented entity, actively intervene in the day-to-day organisation
of prison life, for example by shaping a prison governor’s view of what counts
and what does not count (Bryans, 2007; and Coyle, 2005).14 They stimulate
competition among prison governors leading to cost savings and operational
efficiencies (National Audit Office, 2003). Yet, at the same time, they also
contribute to the creation of forms of organisational introspection, blindness and
boundary creation inhibiting cooperation and information exchange amongst
C© 2013 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
220 MENNICKEN
different prison establishments, thereby harming the Prison Service as a whole
(Bryans, 2007; and House of Commons, 2003, Ev19–22).15
SHIFTS IN RISK AND RESPONSIBILITY
Frequently, the Prison Service has been criticised for its fragmented nature
and multi-layered, malfunctioning governance system (Carter, 2003; Hood
et al., 2004; and Hough et al., 2006). To counter-act the criticisms and better
coordinate activities across prison establishments and probation, following rec-
ommendations outlined in a report by healthcare entrepreneur andmanagement
consultant Lord Carter, the government created in 2004 a new organisational
entity – the National Offender Management Service (NOMS) (Carter, 2003; and
Home Office, 2004). The creation of NOMS followed Carter’s call for ‘a more
joined-up and constructive approach to offender management’ (Carter, 2003,
p. 4). NOMS came to constitute one of the three largest business areas within
the Home Office, with a total budget of over £4 billion in 2005–06, representing
around 31% of the Home Office resource budget (NOMS, 2005, p. 4). In April
2008, NOMS was moved to the Ministry of Justice as Executive Agency with
separate managerial and budgetary responsibilities (NOMS, 2008). Under the
new Agency Framework, NOMS’ ten Directors of Offender Management are
encouraged to use:
sophisticated Service Level Agreements/contract-management to incentivise high and
to tackle poor performance by prisons and probation areas, both individually and in
collaboration and to improve efficiency year on year (NOMS, 2008, p. 8).
NOMS’ activities are guided by the Specification, Benchmarking and Costing
Programme, which the Ministry of Justice issued in 2008 ‘to define the offender
services that NOMS delivers with specific outcomes, outputs and costs’ and ‘to
drive service improvement and value for money’ (NOMS, 2009, p. 33).
With NOMS, a new accounting entity has been created, which seeks to
embrace and coordinate activities across prisons and probation. How successful
NOMS will be remains to be seen. Within the past few years, NOMS and
the Prison Service have undergone several restructurings. In attempts to make
prisons – public and private – ‘governable’ (Miller and Rose, 1990), accounting
entity concepts and boundaries have not been abandoned, but reconfirmed.
Prisons and the Prison Service as a whole have been recomposed in accordance
with private sector business models, and auditors, accountants, and good
presentation skills have become increasingly significant (Liebling, 2004, p. 69).
Since 2009–10, in accordance with the Financial Reporting Manual issued by
the Treasury, NOMS prepares its accounts in accordance with International
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).16 The reforms are accompanied by shifts
in risk and responsibility. Emphasis has come to be placed on prisons’ self-
regulatory capacity, and private sector systems of risk management and internal
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control have been introduced. The risk of failure has been transformed into
a ‘category of management’ (Power, 2007), something that is to be actively
embraced, instead of being avoided, and in need of being made calculable to be
acted upon:
The system of internal control is designed to manage rather than eliminate the risk of
failure to achieve policies, aims and objectives; it can therefore only provide reasonable
and not absolute assurance of effectiveness. The system of internal control is based
on an ongoing process designed to identify the principal risks to the achievement of
NOMS policies, aims and objectives, to evaluate the likelihood of those risks being
realised and the impact should they be realised, and to manage them efficiently,
effectively and economically (NOMS, 2010, p. 26).
Attempts aimed at reconstructing the prison as a private sector-oriented
accounting entity have paved the way for these developments. They led to
a shift in emphasis from the Prison Service as a whole to individual prison
establishments. Notions of failure and failing have come to be connected
to individual, failing prison organisations. Poor performance has come to be
regarded as the failure of individual operational management which, in turn,
has reinforced a focus on issues of ‘structures’ and ‘systems’ at the expense of
softer, more subtle ‘processes’ and ‘commitment’ (Coyle, 2007; Hough et al.,
2006; and Power, 2007). As the outgoing Chief Inspector of Prisons Anne Owers
highlighted in 2010, a heightened focus on issues of operational management and
penal policies aimed at being ‘tough on crime’ contributed to the development
of an ‘inflated prison system in a shrinking state’ that has become ‘too big to fail
and too big to succeed’, ‘drawing in more and more resources to try to make it
better’ instead of looking into investments ‘instead of and after prison’ (Owers,
2010).17 Prison building programmes have led to the creation of new accounting
entities at the expense of evaluating the Prison Service in the context of society
and investing into alternatives to prison.
CONCLUSION
Since the late 1980s, the Prison Service has undertaken a series of steps
to transform prisons into managerial, performance-oriented entities. Private
sector-oriented accounting tools, such as prison ratings and performance
measurement, and the nexus between accounting, management consulting
and privatisation, have played an important role in this process. Formalised
performance management metrics were first introduced into the Prison Service
by consulting firms (PA Consulting Group, 1989). Consulting expertise was also
called upon by the government to evaluate pros and cons of prison privatisation,
to draw up performance criteria for privately managed prisons, and to develop
more efficient and effective management systems (HomeOffice, 1988 and 2004).
Further, consulting firms were utilised in the conduct of the first market tests,
for example, by individual prisons in preparation of their bids (see e.g., the case
of Strangeways in 1992).
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Taking these interventions by consultants as a starting point, this paper has
examined effects of the accounting tools they introduced, focusing in particular
on the roles of prison rating and performancemeasurement on reconstituting the
prison as a performance-oriented entity. The paper has traced how prisons and
prison governors came to be embedded in an economy of ranking and reputation
management shaped by quests for commensuration (Espeland and Stevens,
1998) and auditability (Power, 1997). Quests for commensuration, however,
proved to be difficult to realise and were accompanied by problematisations of
incommensurability. Public and private prisons came to be overburdened with
performance measures making the monitoring of performance and prioritisation
between targets difficult.
Further, the paper has shown how difficult it is to draw boundaries around
the performance of individual prison entities. The reduction of re-offending, for
example, could not be measured at the level of individual prison establishments,
because of the frequent movement of prisoners in between prisons. Also inter-
organisational activities, for example, in the form of information exchanges and
mutual aid, remained unaccounted for. All this contributed to a decentring of
Prison Service accountability and a shift in emphasis from the Prison Service as
a whole to individual prison entities. We observe a ‘narrowing of the basis of
accountability’ (Kurunma¨ki, 1999, p. 219). Notions of failure and failing came to
be connected to individual, failing prison organisations, rather than the prison
system as whole. Attention has been deflected from issues concerning the roles of
the prison in society, alternatives to imprisonment, and general criminal justice
issues.
Yet, despite these rather negative findings, one should not be too quick
in dismissing the potential that private sector-oriented accounting tools, such
as benchmarking and performance measurement, can have for animating and
focusing debate. Because of their obvious limitations – their proneness to failure,
misrepresentation and narrowing – private sector-oriented performance metrics
and ratings can also come to function as an important platform for debate
about prison values and reform, not least because of the public attention and
criticism they attract. As Espeland and Stevens (1998, p. 330) have highlighted,
quantification can offer ‘a rigorous method for democratizing decisions and
sharing power’, particularly in situations ‘characterised by disparate values,
diverse forms of knowledge, and the wish to incorporate people’s preferences’.
For future research, this raises the question of the extent to which ratings
and performance measurement, and quantification more generally, can be
called upon as ‘moralising’ and ‘democratising’ instruments. It also raises
the question of the extent to which performance measurement can play the
role of a ‘mediating instrument’ (Miller and O’Leary, 2007) connecting a
multitude of actors and domains and including disparate values and rationalities,
such as those of security, rehabilitation, decency and economy. The study of
these questions is beyond the scope of this paper. Yet, the findings presented
here underscore the importance of attending to the different modalities and
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operations of accounting technologies, and their ability (or inability) to reform
practices, reconfigure interests and redefine possibilities for action.
NOTES
1 Heading of article by outgoing HM Chief Inspector of Prisons Anne Owers, The Guardian, 13
July, 2010.
2 In her thoughtful and inspiring book, Liebling (2004) examines the impact of performance
measurement at the level of the individual prisoner. She develops the notion of ‘moral
performance’ to offer an alternative framework of evaluation, next to KPIs, to take into
account relational dynamics between prisoners and prison staff and individual experiences of
the ‘quality of prison life’. In contrast to Liebling’s work, this paper focuses on the prison as
an organisational entity, and consequences and challenges of redefining prisons, through KPIs
and other private sector accounting instruments, in terms of self-contained management units
(accounting entities), which is an issue that Liebling and others have not studied in depth.
3 In 1987–88, the average prison population was 49,300. Average operational cost per prisoner
was £14,300 (‘Report on the work of the Prison Service’, Home Office, 1987/88 Cm516).
Regarding the issue of overcrowding the report states: ‘The pressure of the population [ . . . ]
reached an intensity not experienced before. There was a nightmare-like sense, felt more
sharply than ever before at the top of the Service and, we know, shared by regions and
establishments, of always running and never catching up’ (ibid, p. 1). By 31 March, 1988, the
prison population had exceeded available accommodation by 5,500 (ibid, p. 8). In 2002–03,
the average prison population increased to 71,498 with a total expenditure of £1,733,194,722
and an average cost per prisoner of £24,241. See http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/
cm200405/cmselect/cmhaff/193/193we19.htm (accessed 12 December, 2010). In 2007–08,
the overall average resource cost per prisoner was £39,000 (to nearest £1,000). See http://
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmhansrd/cm081125/text/81125w0033.htm
(accessed 12 December, 2010). For 2008–09 the overall cost of a prison place was £45,000
(to nearest £1,000). See http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmhansrd/
cm100325/text/100325w0008.htm#10032547007259 (accessed 12 December, 2010). In 1988,
England and Wales had 123 prison establishments (all public). In 2012, the number
amounted to 133 (119 public and 14 contracted out prisons) (http://www.justice.gov.uk/
about/noms, accessed 21 June, 2012).
4 The 1990 riots had started in April 1990 in Strangeways Prison (Manchester). From there
they spread to more than 20 prisons throughout the country. As Resodihardjo (2009, p. 93)
writes: For Great Britain, these were ‘the most serious series of riots ever experienced. [ . . . ]
When the quiet returned, three people had died, 133 inmates and 282 prison staff had been
injured and there the cost of the damage ran into millions of pounds.’
5 The first private prison was opened in England and Wales in 1992 (Wolds remand prison)
(James et al., 1997). At present, there are 14 private prisons contractually managed
by private companies such as Sodexo Justice Services, Serco and G4S Justice Services
(http://www.justice.gov.uk/contacts/prison-finder/contracted-out-prisons, accessed 20 June,
2012).
6 With respect to market testing, Black (1993, pp. 27–30) wrote: ‘Market testing within
the Prison Service will be twofold: First, under the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act
1991, the Prison Service will have to compete with the total privatization of certain prison
establishments. [ . . . ] Internal services currently run by the Prison Service are also to be
contracted out, both to the public and private sectors. This is the second tier of market
testing. [ . . . ] In the open market, an agency status Prison Service will have to bid with other
competitive tenders in order to run its own existing establishments, under certain proscribed
conditions.’
7 http://www.adamsmith.org/about-us (accessed 12 June, 2012).
8 How much influence the ASI actually managed to exercise on the government is difficult
to gauge. However, several connections can be traced between the ASI and members of the
Conservative government at the time. Michael Forsyth, for example, who later became a
junior minister at the Home Office with responsibility for prisons and who played an active
part in promoting the idea of private prisons within the Conservative Party, had close links
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with the ASI and championed the Institute’s ideas within the Conservative Party (Ryan and
Ward, 1989, p. 47).
9 www.hmprisonservice.gov.uk/prisoninformation/prisonservicemagazine/index.asp?id=
1435,18,3,18,0,0 (accessed 8 August, 2010), ‘Benchmarking Measures up to Service
Expectations’, Prison Service News No. 229, 2004.
10 These KPIs included: public protection measures (measured in number of escapes),
Offending Behaviour Programme (OBP) completions, OBP starts, number of completed
drug rehabilitation programmes, drug testing results, employment of prisoners upon release,
accommodation of prisoners upon release, number of serious assaults, overcrowding data
(target: number of prisoners held in accommodation units intended for fewer prisoners does
not exceed 26% of the population), staff sickness, race equality data (target: at least 6.3% of
prison staff should be from ethnic minority groups) (NOMS 2009, pp. 18–19).
11 Today, the standards cover a wide range of different topics, such as health and safety,
effective financial management, reduction in the availability of drugs, the role of self-audit in
ensuring compliance, incident management and public protection (http://www.justice.gov.uk/
publications/corporate-reports/hmps/performance-standards, accessed 8 August, 2010).
12 In a memorandum of the Prison Service from 2003 we read: ‘Applying national KPIs directly
to individual prisons can be of limited value. Headline KPIs lack the breadth and depth
needed to capture the full range of activities carried out in a prison. Nor could they reflect
the functional specialism of individual establishments’ (Memorandum by HM Prison Service,
PST 52, February 2003).
13 Another example of the mismatch between performance measurement and underlying
performance in the prison sector is the example of Wormwood Scrubs, which in 2000 had
been identified by the HM Chief Inspector of Prisons as a ‘failing prison’ despite its apparent
effectiveness according to its KPI performance (Liebling, 2004, p. 68).
14 For a general discussion of how accounting measures recreate social worlds see Espeland and
Sauder (2007) and Miller (2001).
15 Also the financial accounting system was lagging behind economic entity concepts. In the
mid-1990s, when the Prison Service was transformed into an Executive Agency, the financial
accounting system was left unreformed, making it difficult to engage in entity-focused cash
flow management and to relate accounting expenditure to income (Landers, 1999).
16 It would be beyond the scope of this paper to engage in a detailed analysis of the consequences
of the financial accounting reforms. However, it can be expected that the financial accounting
reforms reinforce private-sector entity ideas and the narrowing of accountability.
17 See also The Guardian, 13 July, 2010.
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